ABSTRACT This article identifies a class of goods that virtue theory has treated only in its agential aspect, and derives a corollary governing their behaviour under the collapse of freedom. Beauty, health, youth and talent reside in a person without being acts of that person’s freedom; they are not exercised, cannot be withheld, and are perceived whether or not the bearer consents to be perceived. The Ontological Virtue Formula does not compose them and the Inversion Theorem does not describe what happens to them. What happens instead, the article argues, is expropriation with two branches. As the bearer’s field of action approaches zero, a non-agential good does not invert and does not vanish: its valence transfers to the power controlling the bearer, and the good becomes the instrument of the bearer’s further subjection. Where transfer is refused or impossible — where the bearer retains enough freedom to decline but not enough to be safe — the good is destroyed instead, since a good that cannot be appropriated stands as a rebuke to the power that failed to take it. The first branch is documented in the Soviet camp literature and, with an administrative record, in the Islamic State’s enslavement of Yazidi women, where captives were sorted by appearance and priced accordingly. The second branch is documented in acid violence, where the attack targets the face, is intended to disfigure rather than kill, and characteristically follows a refusal. The corollary is then tested on a case involving no physical confinement — image-based sexual abuse — which it predicts and which theories of coercion framed in terms of bodily constraint do not. The article states explicitly what it does not claim: the dominant finding in the attractiveness literature is a beauty premium, not a penalty, and this is treated as evidence for the thesis rather than against it, since the corollary holds that valence is conditional on the openness of the field. KEYWORDS: non-agential goods; expropriation; beauty; freedom substrate; Gulag; Yazidi enslavement; acid violence; image-based sexual abuse; objectification; Philosophy of Virtues HIGHLIGHTS • Identifies non-agential goods — beauty, health, youth, talent — as a class virtue theory has left untheorised, and explains why the Inversion Theorem cannot cover them. • Derives the Expropriation Corollary: under the collapse of freedom, such goods transfer their valence to the controlling power rather than inverting or disappearing. • Establishes a second branch: where the good cannot be appropriated, it is destroyed — and shows that this branch has an annual incidence. • Reads the appearance-based sorting and pricing of enslaved Yazidi women as expropriation with an administrative record. • Explains acid violence structurally: disfigurement after refusal accomplishes by destruction what appropriation could not. • Tests the corollary on image-based sexual abuse, where no body is confined and the field that closes is the field of self-presentation. • Treats the documented beauty premium as confirmation rather than counter-evidence, since the thesis is that valence is freedom-conditional. RELEVANCE Accounts of what is done to persons under domination are organised around what the person does or suffers. This article concerns what the person has — a property not chosen, not exercised, and not surrenderable — and argues that the fate of such properties under unfreedom follows a law. The argument bears on the criminology of custodial and trafficking settings, where appearance-based selection is a documented mechanism rather than an incidental preference; on the law of image and likeness, where expropriation now proceeds without physical control of the bearer; and on virtue theory itself, which has treated freedom as the substrate of what an agent does without asking what freedom does for what an agent merely is. ( direct link )