This paper proposes a layered integrative model of consciousness that seeks to reconcile three widely discussed perspectives: (1) the phenomenal (first-person) reality of subjective experience; (2) the functional account that identifies consciousness with cognitive mechanisms such as information integration, self-modeling, and adaptive optimization; and (3) the social-representational perspective that emphasizes the role of language, culture, and interpersonal exchange in shaping reportable experience. I argue that many apparent conflicts among these perspectives arise from category mistakes—each account addresses different explananda and operates at different explanatory levels. The integrative model organizes consciousness into three interacting layers (Phenomenal, Mechanistic/Functional, and Social-Representational), specifies hypothesized causal and constitutive relations among them, and identifies empirical predictions that distinguish this approach from reductive functionalism and strong social-constructivism. I defend a form of non-reductive physicalism that treats phenomenal experience as a real ontic feature while maintaining that specific functional configurations (information integration, global broadcasting, predictive self-modeling) are necessary for the generation and stability of subjective states. Finally, the paper outlines empirical tests (developmental, comparative, lesion, and dissociation paradigms) and philosophical implications (on explanatory gap debates, the status of philosophical zombies, and normative claims about reporting and intersubjective verification).