Zero-knowledge proofs of set membership underpin privacy-preserving constructions such as ring signatures and anonymous credentials. Existing succinct constructions rely mainly on the Fiat--Shamir transform in the Random Oracle Model (ROM), while standard-model non-interactive proofs from post-quantum assumptions remain either generic and inefficient or asymptotically compact yet concretely impractical. A key obstacle is that existing lattice-based zero-knowledge systems operate over a single ambient modulus, forcing heterogeneous components to be homogenized, inflating parameters and weakening reductions.

We introduce the first \emph{compact lattice-based NIZK arguments for set membership in the standard model} with proof size logarithmic in the set cardinality. Our construction matches the logarithmic proof size of accumulator-based ROM constructions while achieving post-quantum security without random oracles. The main technical ingredient is a new trapdoor Σ\Sigma-protocol supporting linear relations modulo multiple heterogeneous moduli, allowing such relations to be handled at their native moduli without homogenization. This yields a modular approach to compact proofs compatible with lattice accumulators.

As an application, we construct lattice-based ring signatures of size O(logR)O~(λ2)O(\log R)\cdot \widetilde{O}(\lambda^{2}) bits, improving the dependence on the security parameter λ\lambda quadratically over the plain-model construction of Chatterjee et al. (CRYPTO~2021) while retaining optimal logarithmic dependence on the ring size RR. Our construction is in the CRS model, which partly enables this improvement. The scheme achieves statistical anonymity and unforgeability under standard Module-LWE and Module-SIS assumptions.

We also develop two additional tools of independent interest: (i) a generalized Merkle-tree accumulator over module lattices with base-BB decomposition, enabling finer efficiency--assumption trade-offs; and (ii) a message-binding technique that removes the need for costly lattice one-time signatures in standard-model ring signatures.